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Abstract
An important problem of modern cryptography concerns secret public-key com-
putations in algebraic structures. We construct homomorphic cryptosystems being
(secret) epimorphisms f : G → H, where G,H are (publically known) groups and
H is finite. A letter of a message to be encrypted is an element h ∈ H, while
its encryption g ∈ G is such that f(g) = h. A homomorphic cryptosystem allows
one to perform computations (operating in a group G) with encrypted information
(without knowing the original message over H).
In this paper certain homomorphic cryptosystems are constructed for the first
time for non-abelian groups H (earlier, homomorphic cryptosystems were known
only in the Abelian case). In fact, we present such a system for any solvable (fixed)
group H.
1 Introduction
In what follows all the groups are presented in some natural way depending on the prob-
lem. For example, the special constructions of Section 2 are based on the groups Z+n
and Z∗n just given via n, whereas the general construction of Section 3 requires only that
elements of a group in question can be generated and moreover, the multiplication and
taking the inverse in the group can be performed efficiently. In the latter case the groups
can be presented by generators and relations or even by generic algorithms (see e.g. [14]).
There is a lot of public-key cryptosystems using groups (see e.g. [2, 11, 12, 15, 20, 21])
but only a few of them have a homomorphic property in the sense of the following definition
(cf. also [7, 22, 23]).
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Definition 1.1 Let H be a finite non-identity group, G a finitely generated group and
f : G → H an epimorphism. Suppose that R is a set of distinct representatives of the
right cosets of G with respect to ker(f), A is a set of words in some alphabet and a mapping
P : A → G such that im(P ) = ker(f). A triple S = (R,A, P ) is called a homomorphic
cryptosystem over H with respect to f , if the following conditions are satisfied:
(H1) one can get random elements (of the sets A,G,H), compute the inverse of an ele-
ment and the product of two elements (in the group G or H) in polynomial in N
probabilistic time where N is the size of presentations of G,H and A;
(H2) |R| = |H| and for any element g ∈ R its image f(g) as well as for any element
h ∈ H its unique preimage g ∈ R such that f(g) = h can be computed in polynomial
in N probabilistic time;
(H3) the mapping P is a trapdoor function.
Remark 1.2 We require that the set R is given explicitly by a list of elements of G. So,
condition (H2) implies that without loss of generality one can assume that the group H is
represented by its multiplication table.
Condition (H3) means (see [8]) that the values of P can be computed in polynomial in
N probabilistic time, whereas finding of the inverse mapping P−1 is a hard computational
problem which can be solved with the help of some additional secret information (for
instance, knowing some invariant of the group G). In a homomorphic cryptosystem S
the elements of H are (publically) encrypted in a probabilistic manner by the elements
of G, all the computations are performed in G and the result is decrypted to H . More
precisely:
Public Key: G,H,R,A, P, f |R.
Secret Key: finding P−1.
Encryption: given a plaintext h ∈ H take r ∈ R such that f(r) = h (invoking (H2))
and a random element a ∈ A; the ciphertext of h is the element P (a)r of G (the element
a as well as the product P (a)r is computed by means of (H1)).
Decryption: given g ∈ G find the elements r ∈ R and a ∈ A such that rg−1 = P (a) (for
computing P (a) see (H3)); set the plaintext of g to be f(g) = f(r) (the element f(r) is
computed by means of (H2)).
One can see that the encryption procedure can be performed by means of public keys
efficiently. However, the decryption procedure is a secret one in the following sense. To
find the element r one has to solve in fact, the membership problem for the subgroup
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ker(f) of the group G. We assume that a solution for each instance g′ ∈ ker(f) of this
problem must have a “proof”, which is actually an element a ∈ P−1(g′). Thus, the secrecy
of the system is based on the assumption that finding an element in the set P−1(g′) is an
intractable computation problem. On the other hand, our ability to compute P−1 enables
us to efficiently implement the decryption algorithm. One can treat P as a proof system
for ker(f) in the sense of [3]. Moreover, in case when A is a certain group and P is a
homomorphism we have the following exact sequence of group homomorphisms
A
P
→G
f
→H→{1}
(recall that the exact sequence means that the image of each homomorphism in it coincides
with the kernel of the next one).
In the present paper the group H being an alphabet of plaintext messages is always
finite (and rather small) and given by its multiplication table, while the group G of
ciphertext messages could be infinite but being always finitely generated. However, the
infinitness of G is not an obstacle for encrypting (and decrypting) since an element fromH
is encrypted by a finite word in generators of G. For example, in [6] for an (infinite, non-
abelian in general) group H given by m generators and relations a natural epimorphism
f : Fm → H from a free group Fm is considered. Thus, for any element of H one can
produce its preimages (encryptions) by inserting in a word (being already a produced
preimage of f) from Fm any relation defining H . In other terms, decrypting of f reduces
to the word problem in H . The main difference with our approach is that we consider free
products over groups of number-theoretic nature like Z∗n (rather than given by generators
and relations). This allows one to provide evidence for difficulty of decryption.
Definition 1.3 Gcrypt is the class of all finite groups H for which there exists a homo-
morphic cryptosystem over H.
In the context of our definition of a homomorphic cryptosystem the main problem we
study in this paper is to prove that the class Gcrypt contains all solvable nonidentity groups
(see Theorem 3.6).
To our knowledge all known at present homomorphic cryptosystems are more or less
modifications of the following one. Let n be the product of two distinct large primes of
size O(logn). Set G = {g ∈ Z∗n : Jn(g) = 1} where Jn is the Jacobi symbol, and H = Z
+
2 .
Then given a non-square g0 ∈ G the triple (R,A, P ) where
R = {1, g0}, A = Z
∗
n, P (g) : g 7→ g
2,
is a homomorphic cryptosystem over H with respect to the natural epimorphism f : G →
H with ker(f) = {g2 : g ∈ Z∗n} (see [9, 8]). We call it the quadratic residue cryptosystem.
It can be proved (see [9, 8]) that in this case finding P−1 is not easier than factoring n,
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whereas given a prime divisor of n the computation of P−1 can be performed in polynomial
time in log n.
It is an essential assumption (being a shortcoming) in the quadratic residue cryp-
tosystem as well as other cryptosystems cited below that its security relies on a fixed a
priori (proof system) P . Indeed, it is not excluded that adversary could verify whether
an element of G belongs to ker(f) avoiding making use of P , for example, in case of the
quadratic residue cryptosystem that would mean verifying that g ∈ G is a square without
providing a square root of g. Although, there is a common conjecture that verifying for
an element to be a square (as well as some power) is also difficult.
Let us mention that a cryptosystem from [18] over H = Z+n (for the same assumptions
on n as in the quadratic residue cryptosystem) with respect to the homomorphism f :
G → H where G = Z∗n2 and ker(f) = {g
n : g ∈ G}, in which A = G and P : g 7→ gn, is
not homomorphic in the sense of Definition 1.1 because condition (H3) of it does not hold.
(Since |G| ≤ |H|2, one can inverse P in a polynomial time in |H|.) By the same reason
the cryptosystem from [16] over H = Z+p with respect to the homomorphism f : G → H
where G = Z∗p2q and ker(f) = {g
pq : g ∈ G} (here the integers p, q are distinct large
primes of the same size) is also not homomorphic (besides, in this system only a part of
the group H is encrypted). Some cryptosystems over certain dihedral groups were studied
in [20].
We note in addition that an alternative setting of a homomorphic (in fact, isomorphic)
encryption E (and a decryption D = E−1) was proposed in [12]. Unlike Definition 1.1
the encryption E : G → G is executed in the same set G (being an elliptic curve over
the ring Zn) treated as the set of plaintext messages. If n is composite, then G is not a
group while being endowed with a partially defined binary operation which converts G
in a group when n is prime. The problem of decrypting this cryptosystem is close to the
factoring of n. In this aspect [12] is similar to the well-known RSA scheme (see e.g. [8])
if to interprete RSA as a homomorphism (in fact, isomorphism) E : Z∗n → Z
∗
n, for which
the security relies on the difficulty of finding the order of the group Z∗n.
We complete the introduction by mentioning some cryptosystems using groups but
not being homomorphic in the sense of Definition 1.1. The well-known example is a
cryptosystem which relies on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol (see e.g. [8]). It
involves cyclic groups and relates to the discrete logarithm problem [14]; the complexity of
this system was studied in [4]. Some generalizations of this system to non-abelian groups
(in particular, the matrix groups over some rings) were suggested in [17] where secrecy was
based on an analog of the discrete logarithm problems in groups of inner automorphisms.
Certain variations of the Diffie-Hellman systems over the braid groups were described
in [11]; here several trapdoor one-way functions connected with the conjugacy and the
taking root problems in the braid groups were proposed. Finally it should be noted that
a cryptosystem from [15] is based on a monomorphism Z+m → Z
∗
n by means of which x is
encrypted by gx (modn) where n, g constitute a public key; its decrypting relates to the
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discrete logarithm problem and is feasible in this situation due to a special choice of n
and m (cf. also [2]).
2 Homomorphic cryptosystems over cyclic groups
In this section we present an explicit homomorphic cryptosystem over a cyclic group
of a prime order m whose decription is based on taking m-roots in the group Z∗n for a
suitable n ∈ N. It can be considered in a sense as a generalization of the quadratic residue
cryptosystem over Z+2 . Throughout this section given n ∈ N we denote by |n| the size of
the number n.
Given m,N ∈ N set TN = {(p, q) : p, q are primes, |p| = |q| = N, p < q} and
DN,m = {n ∈ N : n = pq, (p, q) ∈ TN , m|p− 1, GCD(m, q − 1) = 1}.
From the Dirichlet’s theorem on primes in arithmetic progressions [5] it follows that given
an odd prime m, the set DN,m is not empty for sufficiently large numbers N .
Let n ∈ DN,m for some natural number N and an odd prime m. Then the group
G = Z∗n has a (normal) subgroup G0 = {g
m : g ∈ G} the factor by which is isomorphic
to the group H = Z+m. Denote by f the corresponding epimorphism from G to H . The
mapping
P : G → G, g 7→ gm (1)
is obviously a polynomial time computable homomorphism such that im(P ) = ker(f).
Next, any element of the set
Rm,n = {R ⊂ G : |f(R)| = |R| = m}
is a system of distinct representatives of the cosets of G by G0. We observe that given
the decomposition n = pq one can find an element R ∈ Rm,n in probabilistic time |n|
O(1).
Indeed, since m is a prime, it suffices to compute a random element sp ∈ Z
∗
p such that
s
(p−1)/m
p 6= 1, and an element sq ∈ Z
∗
q , then find by the Chineese reminder theorem the
unique element s ∈ Z∗q such that s = sp (mod p), s = sq (mod q), and set R = {s
itmi : i =
0, . . . , m− 1} for arbitrary elements ti ∈ Z
∗
n.
We claim that the triple SN,m,n = (R,A, P ) with arbitrary chosen set R ∈ Rm,n, A = G
and P defined by (1) is a homomorphic cryptosystem over the group H with respect to
the epimorphism f whenever the following statement is true:
Assumption (*). For an odd prime m the problem P(m), of finding the m-root in Z∗n
with n ∈ DN,m given an element R ∈ Rm,n is not easier than the same problem without
any such R.
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Let us present the group G by the number n and the groupH by the set of its elements.
Then for the triple SN,m,n conditions (H1) and (H2) of Definition 1.1 are trivially satisfied
(the image of the above element sitmi with respect to the homomorphism f equals i ∈ Z
+
m).
In fact, condition (H3) would follow from the next lemma.
Lemma 2.1 Let N ∈ N, m be an odd prime and n ∈ DN,m. Then
(1) given primes p and q such that n = pq and an element g ∈ Z∗n one can verify whether
g is an m-power and if it is the case one can find an m-root of g in probabilistic
polynomial time in N ;
(2) the factoring problem for n is probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the problem
of finding an m-root in Z∗n.
Proof. Throughout the proof we will use the canonical decomposition Z∗n = Z
∗
p × Z
∗
q . To
prove statement (1) we make use of Rabin’s probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm for
finding roots of polynomials over finite prime fields (see [19]). Namely, given the primes
p, q and g ∈ Z∗n we proceed as follows:
Step 1. Find the elements gp ∈ Z
∗
p and gq ∈ Z
∗
q such that g = gp × gq, i.e.
gp = g (mod p), gq = g (mod q).
Step 2. By Rabin’s algorithm (for a prime field) find some roots hp ∈ Z
∗
p and
hq ∈ Z
∗
q of the polynomials x
m − gp and x
m − gq, respectively.
Step 3. Output h = hp × hq.
Observe that the described algorithm fails (at Step 2) if and only if g is not an m-power.
Since, obviously, hm = hmp × h
m
q = gp × gq = g, statement (1) of the lemma is proved.
To prove statement (2) suppose that we are supplied with a probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm Qn that given g ∈ Z
∗
n computes an m-root Qn(g) of g. The following
procedure using well-known observations [8] shows how Qn helps to find the numbers p
and q.
Step 1. Randomly choose x ∈ Z∗n.
Step 2. Set y = Qn(x
m). If x = y, then go to Step 1.
Step 3. Output q = GCD(x− y, n) and p = n/q.
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Let x = xp× xq and y = yp× yq where xp, yp ∈ Z
∗
p and xq, yq ∈ Z
∗
q . From Step 2 it follows
that xmq = y
m
q . On the other hand, since n ∈ DN,m, we have GCD(q − 1, m) = 1. Thus
xq = yq (mod q) and hence
x = xq = yq = y (mod q).
So, x − y 6= 0 (modn) is a multiple of q. To complete the proof we note that since
m = O(1), the loop of Steps 1,2 terminates with a large probability after a polynomial
number of iterations.
Unfortunately, we don’t know how to apply this lemma without assumption (*) be-
cause in our case the system SN,m,n includes the set R ∈ Rm,n. However, from it we obtain
the following statement.
Theorem 2.2 Under assumption (*) the triple SN,m,n for an odd prime m is a homo-
morphic cryptosystem over Z+m; in particular, the class Gcrypt contains each cyclic group
of a prime order.
We complete the section by mentioning that SN,m,n can be slightly modified to avoid
the applying of Rabin’s algorithm for finding roots of polynomials over finite fields. In
principle, to implement the decryption algorithm it suffices to determine whether a given
number g ∈ G belongs to the group G0 or not. However, this can be done by observing
that g ∈ G0 iff g
(p−1)/m
p = 1 (mod p) where gp is the component of g in the factor Z
∗
p of
G = Z∗p × Z
∗
q .
3 Homomorphic cryptosystems using free products
3.1. Throughout the section for a set X we denote by W (X) the set of all words in the
alphabet X . For an element w ∈ W (X) we denote by |w| the length of w.
Let G1, . . . , Gm be a set of m ≥ 1 pairwise disjoint finite groups. For i = 1, . . . , m set
Xi = Gi \ {1Gi}, Ri = {xyz ∈ W (Xi) : x, y, z ∈ Xi, z
−1 = xy}.
Then Gi = 〈Xi;Ri〉, i.e. Gi is the group given by the set Xi of generators and the set Ri
of relations. Set XG = ∪
m
i=1Xi and RG = ∪
m
i=1Ri. The group
G = G1 ∗ · · · ∗Gm = 〈XG; RG〉
is called the free product of the groups G1, . . . , Gm (see [13]). From the definition it follows
that each element of G can be represented by the uniquely determined (canonical) word
of WG = W (XG) such that no two adjacent letters of it belong to the same set among
the sets Xi. This enables us to identify G with the subset of WG consisting of all such
words. Thus G = {w ∈ WG : w ∈ WG} where w is the canonical word corresponding to a
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word w. In particular, g = g for all g ∈ G. Due to identifying the groups G1, . . . , Gm and
G with the corresponding subsets of the set WG, we will assume below that the identities
of these groups are equal to the empty word of WG.
Suppose we are given epimorphisms fi : Gi → Ki, i = 1, . . . , m. Assuming the groups
K1, . . . , Km being pairwise disjoint we set K = K1 ∗ · · · ∗Km and WK = W (XK) where
XK = ∪
m
i=1(Ki \ {1Ki}). Then the natural surjection WG → WK replacing the elements
of XG by their images in XK with respect to corresponding fi, induces an epimorphism
f ∗ : G → K, f ∗|Xi = fi, i = 1, . . . , m. (2)
Moreover, since the conditions f ∗|Xi = fi define the images of the generators of G, the
epimorphism f ∗ is the unique epimorphism from G onto K satisfying these conditions.
3.2. Let us study the kernel of the epimorphism f ∗. To do this suppose that Ki
is a cyclic group of a prime order and (Ri, Ai, Pi) is a homomorphic cryptosystem over
the group Ki with respect to the epimorphism fi : Gi → Ki, described in Section 2,
i = 1, . . . , m. Let w1, w2 ∈ WG and x ∈ Gi for some i. By an elementary transformation
of the word w1xw2 ∈ WG we mean replacing of x by a certain word x1Pj(aj)x2 where
x1, x2 ∈ Gi with x = x1x2 and aj ∈ Aj for some j:
w1xw2 → w1(x1Pj(aj)x2)w2. (3)
Denote by W0 the set of all words of WG which can be obtained from the empty word by
a sequence of elementary transformations and set G0 = {w : w ∈ W0}.
Lemma 3.1 In the above notations, ker(f ∗) = G0.
Proof. First, let w = w1xw2 where w1, w2 ∈ WG and x ∈ Gi for some i, to be a word
of WG. Suppose that a word w
′ ∈ WG is obtained from w by the elementary transfor-
mation (3). Then the words w,w′ belong or not to the group ker(f ∗) simultaneously.
Indeed,
f ∗(w′) = f ∗(w1x1Pj(aj)x2w2) = f
∗(w1)f
∗(x1)f
∗(x2)f
∗(w2) =
f ∗(w1)f
∗(x)f ∗(w2) = f
∗(w1xw2) = f
∗(w). (4)
So, the inclusion ker(f ∗) ⊃ G0 follows by the induction on the number of elementary
transformation used for constructing an element of G0.
Conversely, let w′ ∈ ker(f ∗). Let us prove that w′ ∈ G0 by the induction on |w
′|. If
|w′| = 0, then the statement is obvious. Suppose |w′| > 0. Then w′ = w1xw2 for some
w1, w2 ∈ WG and x ∈ ker(fi) for some i. (Indeed, otherwise since w′ = w
′, we conclude
that |w′| = |f ∗(w′)|. So, |f ∗(w′)| > 0 which contradicts the fact that w′ ∈ ker(f ∗).) So, w′
is obtained from the word w = w1w2 of WG by the elementary transformation (3). Since
w′ ∈ ker(f ∗) from (4) it follows that w ∈ ker(f ∗). On the other hand, it is easy to see
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that |w| ≤ |w| < |w′|. So, by the induction hypothesis we conclude that w ∈ G0. By the
definition of w this implies that w′ ∈ G0. Thus ker(f
∗) ⊂ G0 and we are done.
Let g ∈ ker(f ∗). Then from Lemma 3.1 it follows that g can be obtained from the
empty word by a sequence of elementary transformations. Moreover, the proof of this
lemma implies that there exists such a sequence consisting of at most |g| elementary
transformations. Any such sequence is called a proof for g (more precisely, a proof of
the membership of g ∈ ker(f ∗), cf. (H3) in Definition 1.1). It is easy to see that any
elementary transformation (3) is uniquely determined by the following data: the position
of the letter x ∈ Gi, the word x1x2x
−1 ∈ Rj and the element aj ∈ Aj . Thus any proof for
the element g can be represented by a word p in the alphabet N×RG× (∪iAi). One can
see that in this case |p| is bounded by a polynomial in |g|.
We define A∗ to be the set of all proofs for the elements of ker(f ∗). It should be stressed
that A∗ includes only “short” (consisting of at most |g| elementary transformations) proofs
for an element g ∈ ker(f ∗) and does not contain “proofs” for all words ofW0. For a given s
one can generate a random element of A∗ of the length s in time sO(1). Indeed, due to the
definition of the elementary transformation (3) it suffices to choose randomly positions
in a current word and elements of Ai for all i = 1, . . . , m. However, this can be done
with the help of the algorithms of the homomorphic cryptosystem (Ri, Ai, Pi) over Ki
(see condition (H1) of Definition 1.1).
Lemma 3.2 The image of the mapping P ∗ : A∗ → G defined by P ∗(a) = g iff a is a proof
for g, equals ker(f ∗). Moreover, the following statements hold:
(i1) given a ∈ A∗ the element P ∗(a) can be found in polynomial time in |a|,
(i2) if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} there is an oracle Qi which for any element gi ∈ ker(fi)
produces a certain ai ∈ P
−1
i (gi), then given g ∈ ker(f
∗) a proof a ∈ A∗ for g can
be found by means of at most |g|2 calls of oracles Qi for P
−1
i (gi), i = 1, . . . , m,
gi ∈ ker(fi),
(i3) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and g ∈ ker(fi) the problem of finding an element in P
−1
i (g)
is polynomial time reducible to the problem of finding an element in (P ∗)−1(g).
Proof. The equality im(P ∗) = ker(f ∗) follows from Lemma 3.1. Statement (i1) follows
from the fact that any elementary transformation (3) of g ∈ WG is reduced to finding
Pj(aj) which can be done in polynomial in |aj| ≤ |a| time. To prove statement (i2) one
can apply the following obvious procedure testing membership of a word w ∈ WG to the
set W0.
Step 1. Using multiplications in the groups Gi, i = 1, . . . , m, find the canonical
word w of the word w.
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Step 2. Using the oracles Qi, i = 1, . . . , m, delete any letter x ∈ ker(fi) from the
(current) word w. If there was at least one deletion, then go to Step 1.
Step 3. If the resulting word is empty, then w ∈ W0.
In fact, this procedure is the algorithmic version of the proof of Lemma 3.1. To find
a proof for arbitrary g ∈ ker(f ∗), it suffices to apply the above procedure to the word
g ∈ WG and to collect all results at Steps 1 and 2. Since the number of them is at most
|g|, and the number of calls the oracles Qi at Step 2 is also at most |g|, statement (i2)
follows.
To prove statement (i3) let i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and g ∈ Gi. Then since obviously g ∈ ker(fi)
iff g ∈ ker(f ∗), one can test whether g ∈ ker(fi) by means of an algorithm finding (P
∗)−1.
Moreover, if g ∈ ker(fi), then this algorithm yields a proof from A
∗ for the element g.
Set T to be the set of all elements aj ∈ Ai of elementary transformations (3) belonging to
this proof. Then g =
∏
aj∈T
P (aj). Since the set Ai is an Abelian group and the mapping
Pi : Ai → Gi is a homomorphism, this implies that a =
∏
aj∈T
aj is a proof for g and we
are done.
Let us describe a special system of distinct representatives of the right cosets of G
with respect to ker(f ∗). Set WR = W (∪iRi). Then WR ⊂WG and the set
R∗ = G ∩WR (5)
is a system of distinct representatives of the right cosets of G with respect to ker(f ∗).
Indeed, R∗ consists of all the words of WR which are canonical words of WG. So, no two
elements of R∗ belong to the same right coset of G with respect to ker(f ∗). Thus our
claim follows from the fact that the restriction of the mapping f ∗ on R∗ is the bijection
from R∗ onto K coinciding with fi on Ri, i = 1, . . . , m.
3.3. We need one more special homomorphism of a free product. To do this we
recall some facts on semidirect products of groups (see e.g. [10]). Suppose that K1, K2
are groups and ϕ : K2 → Aut(K1) is a homomorphism. Then the set K1 ×K2 forms a
group with the multiplication given by
(k1, k2)(l1, l2) = (k1(l1)
ϕ(k−1
2
), k2l2), k1, l1 ∈ K1, k2, l2 ∈ K2.
This group is called a semidirect product of K1 and K2 (with respect to the homomor-
phism ϕ) and is denoted by H = Π(K1, K2). One can see that it contains the subgroup K
′
i
(isomorphic to Ki) consisting of all pairs with 1K3−i as the (3− i)-th coordinate, i = 1, 2.
Moreover, K ′1 is a normal subgroup of H , K
′
1 ∩K
′
2 = {1H} and H = K
′
1K
′
2. In general,
if an arbitrary group H have such two subgroups K ′1, K
′
2, then it is isomorphic to the
semidirect product of them with respect to the homomorphism ϕ induced by the action
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of K ′2 on K
′
1 by the conjugation. In what follows we shall identify Ki with K
′
i, i = 1, 2.
We also extend the definition of the semidirect product to arbitrary number of factors by
means of setting for m ≥ 3
Π(K1, K2, . . . , Km) = Π(K1,Π(K2, . . . , Km))
with respect to the suitable homomorphisms ϕ. Thus Π(Ki, . . . , Km) = Π(Ki, K
(i)) where
K(i) = Π(Ki+1, . . . , Km), for all i = 1, . . . , m− 1 (for i = m− 1 we adopt that Π(Km) =
Km). In what follows the group Π(K1, K2, . . . , Km) will be “small” and presented by its
multiplication table. Thus, its subgroups K1, . . . , Km are also small and for a given i the
homomorphism ϕi : K
(i) → Aut(Ki) can be presented by indicating the permutations
ϕi(k) of the set Ki for all k ∈ K
(i).
Lemma 3.3 Let H = Π(K1, . . . , Km) and K = K1∗· · ·∗Km for a set of pairwise disjoint
finite groups K1, . . . , Km. Then there exists an epimorphism Q : K → H such that given
k ∈ K one can find the element Q(k) in time polynomial in |k| and |H|.
Proof. Due to our assumptions we see that the set H as well as the set
RH = {x
−1yxy′ ∈ WK : x ∈ K
(i), y ∈ Ki, y
′ = (x−1yx)−1, i = 1, . . . , m− 1}
are the subsets of the group K. From the definition of the free product it follows that
the elements of H are distinct elements of the quotient group K obtained from K by
imposing the set RH of relations. On the other hand, from the definition of RH it follows
that any element k ∈ K can be represented by an element of K of the form k1 · · ·km for
some ki ∈ Ki, i = 1, . . . , m, moreover this representation is unique, since otherwise the
equality of two such representations one could deduce from the relations RH which hold
in the group H as well, but in the group H any two such representations differ. After
identifying K with the set of all such elements, we see that the mapping
K → H, k 7→ k1 · · · km
is an isomorphism. Denote by Q the composition of the natural epimorpism K → K with
this isomorphism. Then the mapping Q : K → H is an epimorphism and given k ∈ K
the computation of Q(k) consists in a reduction of k modulo the relations of RH to the
form k1 · · · km. This can be done by means of the following procedure
Step 1. If k is the empty word, then output Q(k) = k.
Step 2. Using the relations x−1yxy′ ∈ RH with arbitrary x ∈ K
(1) and y ∈ K1
reduce k to the form k1k˜ where k1 ∈ K1 and k˜ ∈ K˜ with K˜ = K2 ∗ · · · ∗Km.
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Step 3. Applying the procedure recursively to k˜ ∈ K˜ and H˜ = K(2), output
Q(k) = k1Q(k˜).
First, we observe that the length of any intermediate word in the above procedure is
at most |k|. Next, the number of recursive calls (at Step 3) is at most |m|. Thus the
procedure can be done in time polynomial in |k| and |H|. Lemma is proved.
3.4. We are ready to describe the main construction of this section. LetK1, . . . , Km be
a set of pairwise disjoint cyclic groups of prime orders and H = Π(K1, . . . , Km). Suppose
that we are given a homorphic cryptosystem (Ri, Ai, Pi) over the group Ki with respect to
the homomorphism fi : Gi → Ki from Section 2, i = 1, . . . , m. Without loss of generality
we assume that the groups Gi are pairwise disjoint. Set G = G1 ∗ · · · ∗ Gm. Then from
the definition of f ∗ (see formula (2)) and Lemma 3.3 it follows that the mapping f = Qf ∗
from G to H is an epimorphism.
Theorem 3.4 The triple (R,A, P ) where R is an arbitrary set of distinct representatives
of the right cosets of G with respect to ker(f), provided that R fulfils the condition (H2)
of Definition 1.1,
A = {(a, r) ∈ A∗ × R∗ : f(r) = 1H}, P : A→ G, (a, r) 7→ P ∗(a)r
with A∗, P ∗ defined in Subsection 3.2 and R∗ defined in (5), is a homomorphic cryptosys-
tem over the group H with respect to the homomorphism f : G → H.
Proof. From the definition of R∗ it follows that given g ∈ G there exist uniquely de-
termined g0 ∈ ker(f
∗) and r ∈ R∗ such that g = g0r. So, f(g) = Q(f
∗(g0)f
∗(r)) =
Q(f ∗(r)) = f(r). Thus g ∈ ker(f) iff f(r) = 1. By Lemma 3.2 this implies that
im(P ) = ker(f). To check the condition (H1) of Definition 1.1 we have to show how
to get random elements of A. This follows from the remarks before Lemma 3.2 for ran-
dom generating elements of A∗, whereas the sets Ri, i = 1, . . . , m, are given explicitly.
Thus it remains to verify that P is a trapdoor function (i.e. the condition (H3)).
First, we observe that by statement (i1) of Lemma 3.2 and by Lemma 3.3 the mapping
P is polynomial time computable. Second, by condition (H3) for homomorphic cryptosys-
tems (Ri, Ai, Pi) there exists an algorithm that given i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and gi ∈ Gi efficiently
finds an element of the set P−1i (gi). Let us show that it suffices to invert P . Indeed, in
this case given g ∈ G the element f ∗(g) ∈ K can be found efficiently. Since g = g0r for
uniquely determined g0 ∈ ker(f
∗) and r ∈ R∗, and f ∗(r) = f ∗(g), one can compute the
element r and hence the element g0 = gr
−1 within the same time. By statement (i2) of
Lemma 3.2 we can also find an element a ∈ A∗ such that P ∗(a) = g0. Thus to invert P it
suffices to test whether f(r) = 1H holds (if f(r) = 1H , then (a, r) ∈ A and P (a, r) = g).
We have f(r) = Q(f ∗(r)). Next, by condition (H2) for homomorphic cryptosystems
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(Ri, Ai, Pi) we can find the element f
∗(r) and so by Lemma 3.3 the element Q(f ∗(r)),
and finally test the equality f(r) = 1H .
Suppose that one can invert P efficiently. Let g ∈ G. If g 6∈ ker(f), then obviously
g 6∈ ker(f ∗). Let now g ∈ ker(f) and (a, r) ∈ A be a proof for g, i.e. P ∗(a)r = g.
Since r belongs to the right transversal R∗ of ker(f ∗) in G, it follows that g ∈ ker(f ∗)
iff r = 1G. Moreover, if r = 1G, then obviously P
∗(a) = g. Thus the problem of finding
(P ∗)−1 is polynomial time reducible to the problem of finding P−1. So by statement (i3)
of Lemma 3.2 the problem of finding P−1i , i = 1, . . . , m, is polynomial time reducible to
the problem of finding P−1. Thus P is a trapdoor function which completes the proof.
Observe that one can explicitly produce a set R satisfying the condition of Theorem 3.4
(i.e. the condition (H2)). Namely, for each element h ∈ H find a representation h =
k1 · · · km where ki ∈ Ki (cf. Subsection 3.3), and take ri ∈ Ri such that fi(ri) = ki,
i = 1, . . . , m. Then the set of all elements r1 · · · rm for all h ∈ H can be chosen as the
set R.
From Theorems 2.2 and 3.4 we immediately obtain the following statement.
Corollary 3.5 Let K1, . . . , Km be a set of pairwise disjoint cyclic groups of prime orders,
m ≥ 1. Then Π(K1, . . . , Km) ∈ Gcrypt.
3.5. The special cases of a semidirect product are the direct and wreath products.
Indeed, in the latter case the resulting group is a semidirect product of the direct power
of the first group (with the number of the factors being equal to the order of the second
group) by the second group which acts on the product by permutations of direct factors,
see e.g. [10]. Thus as an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.4 we conclude that the
class Gcrypt contains direct and wreath products of cyclic groups of prime orders (cf.
Corollary 3.5). Using this fact we can prove the main result of the paper.
Theorem 3.6 Any solvable nonidentity group belongs to the class Gcrypt.
Proof. It is a well-known fact that any solvable group can be constructed from a cyclic
group of prime order by a sequence of cyclic extensions. On the other hand, from [10,
Theorem 6.2.8] it follows that any extension of one group by another one is isomorphic
to a subgroup of the wreath product of them. So it suffices to verify (cf. Corollary 3.5)
that any nonidentity subgroup of a semidirect product of cyclic groups of prime orders
belongs to the class Gcrypt.
To do this let H ∈ Gcrypt be such a group. Then there exists a homomorphic cryp-
tosystem S = (R,A, P ) over H with respect to some epimorphism f : G → H . Without
loss of generality we assume that S is the homomorphic cryptosystem from Theorem 3.4.
Given explicitely a non-identity subgroup H ′ of H set G′ = f−1(H ′), f ′ = f |G′ and
S ′ = (R′, A′, P ′) where R′ = R ∩ f−1(H ′),
A′ = {(a, r) ∈ A∗ × (R∗)′ : f(r) = 1H}, P
′ : A′ → G′, (a, r) 7→ P ∗(a)r
13
and (R∗)′ = {r ∈ R∗ : f(r) ∈ H ′}. Then S ′ is a homomorphic cryptosystem over H ′
with respect to the homomorphism f ′ : G′ → H ′. Indeed, we present the group G′ as a
subgroup of G generated by the sets im(P ′) and R′. (In this presentation of G′ we would
be unable to recognize its elements in G, but we do not need this.) Now the first two
conditions of the Definition 1.1 are satisfied for S ′ because they are satisfied for S (to
generate a random element of A′, it suffices to generate a random element r′ of (R∗)′ and
for this purpose one can generate a random r ∈ R∗ and set r′ = rr˜ where r˜ is the element
of R′ such that f(r)f(r˜)−1 ∈ H ′). Since ker(f ′) = ker(f), we have im(P ′) = ker(f ′) and
condition (H3) is also satisfied for S ′ because it is satisfied for S.
It should be remarked that the construction of a homomorphic cryptosystem over
a solvable group H described in this section is rather theoretical. The computational
complexity of the underlying algorithms is bounded by a polynomial the degree of which
is a function of |H|. Besides, the size of representing G could be exponential in |H| due
to involving wreath products. However, it seems that more careful implementation can
be developed for small groups.
From Theorem 3.6 it follows that there exists a homomorphic cryptosystem over the
group Sym(n) for n ≤ 4. It would be interesting to construct a homomorphic cryptosystem
over an arbitrary symmetric group, because such a system would provide secret computa-
tions with any permutation group and moreover an implementation of any boolean circuit
in the sense of [1]. In this connection we remark that every boolean circuit of logarithmic
depth can be implemented by a polynomial-time computation in an arbitrary nonsolvable
group (see [1]). On the other hand, it was proved in [1] that over an arbitrary nilpotent
group not any boolean circuit can be implemented. If the group is not nilpotent but is
solvable, then only an exponential size implementation is known [1] and it is conjectured
that one is unable to do better. Thus, if the latter conjecture was wrong, then combining
with Theorem 3.6 would enable us to encrypt any boolean circuit.
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